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Abstract 
 
The governance of rural areas rests with traditional leadership in South Africa. This governance is determined by the fact that 
land is in the custodian of this traditional leadership. Individual persons cannot own the land. This fact makes land a major 
instrument of control by those that have this power of controlling the land. In the province of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, 
citizens have been turned into subjects of the Zulu monarch (Ingonyama). Accordingly, the rural people of KwaZulu-Natal 
cannot by law own the land they occupy. All land is placed under the monarch. This article therefore argues that placing the 
land under Ingonyama is a neo-feudalist practice that constitutionally deprives the rural poor the right to own land and to better 
their lives. It is further argued here that this law will only affect the African population in that province while all other racial 
groups are free to own land privately. Based on the analysis of existing literature, this article aims to show that the democratic 
dispensation of 1994 in South Africa left the rural people out in terms of property relations. The article concludes by saying that 
the Ingonyama Trust Act is a perpetuation of Bantustan politics as it applies only to land that formerly constituted the Bantustan 
of KwaZulu. As a result, this law is most likely to perpetuate rural poverty.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The 1994 South African democratic dispensation came as a miracle after decades of colonial and settler-colonial rules. In 
both instances, the African populations had been subjected to various forms of discrimination and oppression. The year 
1994 represents a watershed in the history of South Africa. A peaceful transition was made from years of oppression to 
freedom for all, with the exception of the African rural inhabitants who have actually been constitutionally denied the 
freedom to individually own property. To illustrate this point, the province of KwaZulu-Natal is chosen for analysis 
because that is the province in South Africa where a major part of the political activity regarding constitutional matters 
takes place. Since 1992, constitutional talks with regard to the position of the Zulu monarch in particular and traditional 
leadership in general in South Africa, have never stopped. This article argues that the (provincial) constitution relegates 
the rural African people to perpetual poverty by placing the land under the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama, in terms of the 
Ingonyama Trust Act No. 3KZ of 1994. 
The objective of this article is to show how that political process prejudices the rural people in South Africa. It is 
therefore not simply a paper on land reform, but speaks to agrarian reform per se. Cousins (2006, p232) explains the 
distinction between agrarian and land reform as follows: 
 
Land reform must be clearly distinguished from agrarian reform. The former is concerned with rights in land, and their 
character, strength and distribution, while the latter is concerned with a broader set of issues: the class character of the 
relations of production and distribution in farming and related enterprises, within both local and non-local markets. It is 
thus concerned with economic and political power and wealth and the connections between them; its central focus is the 
political economy of land, agriculture and natural resources …  
 
It must be pointed out here that no suggestion is being made that governance by chiefs (traditional leadership or 
whatever it is called today) is unique to South Africa. The system is prevalent in many other parts of the continent, and 
the world as well. But that does not mean it is always the best thing to do. In fact, history shows that many societies went 
through this kind of governance, and as societies developed, they discarded it. And, in the South African situation, it has 
proved that the system is not in the developmental interests of the indigenous people. For too long, the system was used 
to subjugate the African people to colonial and settler-colonial rules. Over that period it lost legitimacy in the eyes of the 
governed. It is therefore doubtful that chieftaincy can ever be made to be like it was before colonialism. It also definitely 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 5 No 20 
September  2014 
          
 2456 
cannot be believed that returning to pre-colonial situations is the thing to do. 
 
2. A Brief Profile of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal  
 
KwaZulu-Natal is one of South Africa’s nine provinces. The province constitutes eight per cent of the total area of South 
Africa (92,100 of the total 1,219,090 square kilometres of South Africa) and is bordered by the Indian Ocean in the east, 
Mozambique and Swaziland in the north, Lesotho in the west and the Eastern Cape in the south. 
According to the 2001 Census, KwaZulu-Natal comprises 21% of the total population of South Africa. Of this figure, 
85% is African, with 8.5% Indian, 5.1% white and 1.5% coloured people. Furthermore, 65% percent of the population 
living in rural areas is African, while 8.9% is coloured, 6.9% white and 2.9% Indian. In that province, the African 
population lives mostly in areas that used to be part of the Bantustan of KwaZulu (now KwaZulu-Natal) during the 
apartheid era. 
In this province, poverty and inequality are highest among the African people. The KwaZulu-Natal Department of 
Economic Development and Tourism (2002) indicates that 74% of the population lives below the poverty line, relying on 
remittances, pensions and other state grants as sources of their livelihoods. Of this figure, 62% is African – quite an 
increase from the 54% in 1996. In addition, 40% of the African population is unemployed, 58.4% of which are women. Of 
those who have incomes, whites earn seven times more than the Africans do. The major characteristic of the rural 
population in KwaZulu-Natal is the lack of access to agricultural land, a fact that contributes to high levels of malnutrition. 
Added to the woes of the province of KwaZulu-Natal is the HIV and AIDS epidemic. In 1992, when the country’s 
infection rate was 14%, the rate in KwaZulu-Natal was more than 18%, and 35% of orphans was attributed to AIDS 
(Bradshaw, et al 2000). 
 
3. KwaZulu-Natal within the Wider Context of the South African Land Issue 
 
Land dispossession is a historical fact in South Africa. Particularly the African people, in every region of the country, have 
been victims of land dispossession which logically led to political oppression and economic exclusion. In this respect 
KwaZulu-Natal was no exception. Structures of chieftaincy, or neo-feudalism as it is referred to in this article, applied to 
all indigenous people and everywhere that colonialism had left its marks. The only differences lay in degrees. 
It was only during the political negotiations of the 1990s’ that the Bantustan of KwaZulu chose to advocate for a 
federal state in South Africa (Human Rights Watch, 1993). The bloodshed that accompanied the whole negotiation 
process, and demands for recognition of the Zulu monarch were the only factors that made KwaZulu-Natal appear to be 
different from the rest of the former bantustans. In fact, to this day, all the tribes still have their own traditional leaderships. 
However, the history of nationalism shows that, had the development process not been interrupted by colonialism, the 
country would, at some stage, have united under one political leadership from one of the tribes that existed then 
(Mabutla, 2001). Consequently, the national Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (Act No 41 of 2003), 
applies to all rural African people. As a result, all traditional leaders are accommodated in both the National House of 
Traditional Leaders and the Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders as provided for in section 212 (2)(a) of the 
Constitution.  
The land tenure reform legislation that is most appropriate here is the Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004 
(CLaRA), and the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act 3 of 1994. The CLaRA governs all rural communally held lands 
under traditional leaders, which falls under the Ingonyama Trust Land. Significantly, land tenure reform in rural KwaZulu-
Natal is approached differently to the rest of rural South Africa. Rural KwaZulu-Natal refers here to all the areas that were 
part of the settler-colonial KwaZulu Bantustan prior to 1994 (Mazibuko 2010, p183). Chapter 9 of the CLaRA makes 
special provision for the KwaZulu-Natal rural areas. All such areas in KwaZulu-Natal are governed by the Ingonyama 
Trust1, and are therefore referred to as the Ingonyama Trust Land. All the Ingonyama land is administered by means of 
the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act 3 of 1994. This law places all the powers and authority of land administration in 
the hands of the Ingonyama. Individuals do not have title deeds to this land – it is vested in the Ingonyama. As they have 
no title deeds, they cannot sell the land. It is in the light of this that Mazibuko (2010) argues that institutions have a 
special role in the development of a people in particular in the manner they govern the capital assets at people’s disposal.  
 
 
                                                                            
1 Ingonyama means king/monarch, and in this particular instance land belongs to the Zulu monarch, not to individual citizens of the land 
who only have user rights. 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 5 No 20 
September  2014 
          
 2457 
4. Constitutional Denial of Freedom: Entrenching Neo-Feudalism  
 
In this article, the concept of neo-feudalism will be employed as a model of social construct to explain poverty where the 
rural poor of South Africa live, particularly in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. The article will also indicate the 
characteristics of neo-feudalism as found in practice. Given the difficulty experienced in locating a proper definition of the 
term “neo-feudalism” , this article will provide a definition upon which to work. To this effect, neo-feudalism is hereby 
defined as a system of communal land ownership vested in traditional leadership in a democratic unitary non-feudal 
society. In such a society, ordinary individual members have no right to privately own the land; they cannot, by law, have 
title deeds nor sell the land they live on. 
The situation is referred to as neo-feudal because, while it contains elements of a feudal society of Western 
Europe during the Middle Ages (Bloch 1962, pp72 -167), and probably elsewhere in the world, it is found in a democratic, 
non-feudal (South African) society. Feudalism was characterized by landownership being the supreme method of 
determining social relations. Today South Africa is a democratic country governed by a very liberal constitution that 
grants its citizens almost every freedom possible. However, the constitution binds the rural people to a land tenure 
system which subjects them to chiefs. All rural land belongs to the “monarch”, the Ingonyama (read paramount chief). By 
law, the people living on that land cannot own any part of it in terms of individual private ownership, and consequently 
cannot have title deeds to that land. The Ingonyama, based on custom and tradition, is the custodian of all rural land. 
Indigenous people have always held land communally. Besides these two concepts, no other reasons are advanced to 
justify land deprivation to the poor, rural masses.  
Ferguson (1994, p18) points out that the system of land tenure in rural areas poses an obstacle to transforming the 
society. The rural areas are already part of the capitalist mode of production and, in fact, were used by both colonial and 
settler-colonial administrations as labour reservoirs for the mines and cities. As a result, the concept of transition from 
agrarian social relations to capitalist private property is of limited value in this situation. The South African society is highly 
integrated into the capitalist economic system. No part of the country remains untouched by capitalism. As is the case in 
any capitalist democracy, the Constitution of South Africa, 1996, states that all people have a right to private ownership of 
property  
The second characteristic of neo-feudalism is the system of hereditary chieftaincy, which, once again, is 
perpetuated on the grounds that it is customary and traditional to have these institutions. The chiefs function as heads of 
tribes or clans as found all over rural KwaZulu-Natal. The chiefs, like the Ingonyama, draw their salaries from the public 
purse. To crown the situation, their roles, or job descriptions, are neither clear nor different from that of a police officer. 
The traditional leaders also realize the fact, as pointed out by one inkosi (chief) Hlengwa in a parliament speech in Cape 
Town (www.ifp.org.za), that legislation renders the institution of traditional leadership no different from the activities of any 
non-governmental organization (NGO). Why duplicate services and institutions if the resources could be applied in 
another important quarter? As indicated in the introductory paragraphs, the province of KwaZulu-Natal is a very poor 
province. The money wasted on maintaining the neo-feudal system could be utilised in other crucial areas. The State bill 
to pay for the useless, outdated “customary and traditional” roles could go a long way towards reducing the country’s 
foreign debts and addressing the developmental needs of the people such as poverty, unemployment and inequality.  
The KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act No. 3KZ of 1994 placed all the rural land of the former Bantustan in the 
hands of tribal leadership. On the other hand, all townships that had been part of that Bantustan were excluded from the 
Ingonyama land. In a democracy, it would be expected that the inhabitants concerned should have a say, for example in 
the form of a referendum, in the manner in which they wish to be governed. It is my view, therefore, that the “political 
settlement” reached for KwaZulu-Natal lacks accountability, which is one of the pillars of democracy.  
In view of the above, the following questions seem quite in order:  
1. Is the “Zulu monarch” capable of accountability?  
2. Does the “Zulu monarch” have the (economic) resources to respond to the needs of the people?  
In spite of the now worldwide recognition of the fundamental importance of access to productive land to alleviate 
poverty, the rural poor in South Africa are being denied that opportunity. Instead, the rural poor - women and children in 
particular - will continue to carry the burden of landlessness. At the same time the males and the young people will 
continue providing migrant labour to the cities, the old practice with all its attendant consequences such as family 
breakdowns and putting pressure on limited social services like housing, health and education in urban areas (Nel 2005, 
p253). 
Constitutionally, all South African citizens have the right to stay and own property wherever they wish. But the 
people in KwaZulu-Natal have been denied that constitutional right. The rural poor will continue to live on “borrowed” land 
that they can neither buy nor sell since it belongs to the paramount chief – the Ingonyama. These rural people have, in 
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fact, been disenfranchised in terms of landownership. In South Africa it is easier for foreigners to buy land and own it 
privately than it is for the indigenous people to have access to their own land as a birthright. At the same time, the white 
farmers who live adjacent to the rural black communities have landownership rights of the land they occupy, but not the 
indigenous rural African.  
While some external factors stand in the way of development, neo-feudalism represents contradictory internal 
political and economic power relations and contradictory interests in South Africa. The South African rural poor find 
themselves in a difficult situation: nationally the political machine is reluctant to function and locally the tribal ideologues 
and the elite are only interested in safeguarding their own interests. Generally, the legislation on traditional leadership 
poses difficulties in that at the lower (municipal) level of the democratic political administration, land is controlled by 
chiefs. Issues of who has the final say in such areas and in what manner are currently hotly debated in South Africa (see 
Ntsebeza 2005). Consequently, development is hampered at that level in the affected areas. To this end, neo-feudalism 
represents a pillar of rural underdevelopment in South Africa. 
There seems to be no other reason to retain and maintain these neo-feudal institutions at the expense of the 
taxpayer, except that they are traditional and customary. Traditions and customs are inherently good, one should think, 
as long as they do not become a burden to society. If these institutions could sustain themselves, nobody would probably 
care whether or not they exist. Those who support the system should produce the means to sustain it themselves. The 
State would then not be expected to use public money for the benefit of tribal ideologues while the people they purport to 
represent are starving.  
In the South African context, neo-feudalism represents arrested development. While the political elites choose 
capitalism for themselves, the African rural poor are assigned to poverty-perpetuating conditions of neo-feudalism. The 
rural poor have been made prisoners of tradition and underdevelopment. Under these conditions, they will continue to 
“exist” only at election times; at other times they remain subjects of the chiefs and not citizens of the country. They have 
become constitutionally landless subsistence-farming communities on borrowed land that they cannot dispose of as they 
wish in order to improve their lot. Instead of traditional and customary status quo relating to land access, rural poverty 
could be diminished by allowing the rural people control and ownership over land - with the proper title deeds to it. De 
Soto’s (2000) argument about dead capital in the developing world speaks directly to South Africa’s neo-feudalism. De 
Soto argues that the developing world has a large part of its land occupied by people who do not own it and have no title 
deeds to it. As a result, such land cannot be developed and the country loses revenue. This condition is very typical of the 
South African situation.  
Similarly, South Africa’s own policy in the form of the Rural Development Framework (1997, p71) (in Mazibuko 
2010, p185) states that  
 
Property rights are important for obtaining capital for investment in entrepreneurial activity – either through selling the 
asset or getting finance on the strength of it. For many decades, the African population was deprived of this economic 
opportunity as a result of discriminatory laws which prevented them from owning or leasing land or marketing produce. 
Among other things, this has stifled business related opportunities 
 
To ensure that the rural poor are not impoverished any further by being deceived into commercially parting with 
their land, the State could stipulate conditions for how and when their land can be sold in the land market. For example, 
the State can make it compulsory that every landholder receive training on economic use of the land, and that such land 
may not be sold before the new owners have lived on it for a minimum period of seven years. During that time, the state 
can engage in concerted efforts to educate landowners about various modern land practices. That would, of course, 
require funding, but money spent on such issues for a limited period far outweighs the benefits gained from money spent 
continuously on government welfare programmes for the alleviation of poverty. Arguments can be raised that such 
policies could be very expensive, but such expenses are negligible compared with the money spent on short-term goals 
to address poverty. Large sums of money spent on long-term development goals are more justifiable than large sums 
spent on short-term objectives, while the state plays a welfare role in a situation where people can, in fact, manage to 
look after themselves if given the necessary resources.  
In the spirit of capitalism, some section of the population, particularly the white people, thrive on individual 
landownership but rural Africans suffer in abject poverty under the communal landownership system. It is therefore 
argued here that the rural poor need the constitutional right to individually own the land. Some of the advantages of 
allowing the rural poor to own land can be the following: 
1. The land could be used as collateral to obtain credit from financial institutions, and the credit to improve the 
areas concerned. The increased value of the land could in turn encourage the owners to look after the 
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environment, thereby increasing the value of their properties even further. 
2. The land could be leased out in times of hardship when individuals are unable to cultivate it economically 
themselves. This could ensure owners of a constant income and prevent them from becoming even poorer 
and destitute. The State would be relieved of the burden of looking after huge numbers of people who “cannot 
look after themselves”. The money saved could be used elsewhere for developmental purposes. Indeed, 
Webster (1990, p21) indicates that government efforts to provide food, warmth and shelter for the poor are 
merely addressing the symptoms and not the causes of poverty. Webster concedes that what are actually 
required are attempts towards redistribution of land in favour of the rural people. Land ownership plays a major 
role in ensuring sustainable livelihoods for the rural people; therefore allowing the South African rural poor 
access to and ownership of the land will go a long way towards addressing poverty in that country. In the 
current situation, foreign interests are allowed to own land in South Africa but indigenous people are 
constitutionally deprived of that right. 
3. Landownership has the potential to reduce birth rates. Knowing that they have limited resources, individuals 
are more likely to opt for smaller families. The joy and freedom from poverty would compel individuals to 
ensure the same for their families. Since land is a limited resource, people would also limit their procreation 
habits. The reduced birth rate would lead to reduced population growth. With a smaller population, the carrying 
capacity of the land would increase, and create better chances for sustainable development. 
4. Increased opportunities for protection of the natural environment would be ensured. The economic value of the 
environment should act as a motivating factor to ensure that the land is well looked after. Because individuals 
would now reap direct private benefits from a healthy environment, they would regard it as an investment not 
only for themselves but for their children as well. Considerations regarding population and environment are 
important because, as the South African Human Development Report (2003, pp26 and 82) indicates, the rural 
poor are quite aware that, if resources are used indiscriminately in future, the degraded environment would 
mean less access to the natural resources they depend on for their livelihoods. 
5. Private landownership has the potential to ensure political stability. People are assured of secured sustainable 
livelihoods and are mainly interested in improving their lot instead of forever looking to the state to provide for 
their upkeep. The state then ceases to be a welfare institution and scarce state resources can be applied in 
other more needy areas.  
6. Private ownership of land has the potential to ensure food security for rural and urban populations as people 
become more responsible for their own upkeep. The surplus produce could then be passed on to the urban 
areas. In this way, the rural people would be allowed the freedom that is only an illusion at present - the 
freedom from poverty. 
7. Park (1992, pp191–198) mentions several other benefits of landownership that accrued to the people of Korea 
after that country’s 1950 land reform policies. One of the benefits was increased education for farmers in 
particular, which allowed them to access technology. This increased access to education led in turn to higher 
land productivity and increased use of fertilizers. These increases should therefore be seen as multiplier 
effects of allowing people to own land. 
 
5. A Political Blunder or Political Tactics? 
 
There could be several explanations for the political route chosen for the former bantustans in South Africa. Africa’s 
history is full of bloody secessionist politics. In this case, the South African government could be making attempts to avoid 
a repeat of the continent’s ugly history. The KwaZulu-Natal case could be seen as a political mistake that forced the 
government to pass legislation that is both politically and economically unsustainable, in order to satisfy the tribal 
ideologues who always threaten violence if they do not get their way democratically. How else can it be explained that the 
feudal lords (chiefs) are considered to be politically non-aligned when their very top leadership occupy senior leadership 
positions in political parties? It is, in fact, the feudal lords that are behind the promulgation of the pieces of legislation such 
as discussed in this article. Its leadership, backed by the other apartheid political formations at the time of political 
negotiations in the 1990s, was very vocal in their support of a federation state in South Africa because they preferred 
‘self-governance’ to the unitary state as proposed by the broad liberation movement in the country. Consequently, the 
supposedly-democratic State has allowed itself to be derailed from a developmental path that had the potential to benefit 
everyone in the country. 
Another explanation for giving in to the demands of the KwaZulu-Natal tribal leadership could be that of political 
tactics. The national ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), could be sacrificing the poor rural areas of 
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KwaZulu-Natal to the “Zulu monarch” for example, knowing that this monarch will never be able to meet the needs of their 
subjects. This failure could fuel unpopularity of the “monarch”. If it were possible, they could have delivered the required 
services during the apartheid era when they had all the opportunities to develop separately under the Verwoerdian 
(settler-colonial) model. But instead, the South Africa’s rural areas (in the words of Rodney 1972, p233) became the 
dumping ground for the illiterate, semi-literate, the meek, the unemployed and the unemployable. 
The Ingonyama Trust Act is a further political move in that it takes away the urban townships from the “monarchy”. 
In South Africa, townships are known for their political volatility. Township dwellers will not tolerate non-delivery of 
essential services and are able to bring the whole country to the brink of economic collapse and political turmoil. It is also 
in the townships where the vocal, liberated African elites live, regardless of tribal origins. With the exception probably of 
those who have just arrived in the cities and are still vulnerable to tribal inclinations, urban people are more interested in a 
better and progressive life for themselves and their families. In this sense, the political move is likely to work in favour of 
the ruling party. 
Another view that could be advanced for maintaining the chieftaincy system is what Ferguson (1994) calls the anti-
politics machine. As in the colonial/settler-colonial era when the system of chieftaincy was a keystone of British indirect 
rule and the white supremacy ideology of separate development/apartheid, and therefore underdevelopment, so it is used 
today to depoliticize the rural areas in South Africa. The neo-liberal policies of the day having failed them, the rural people 
in KwaZulu-Natal are subjected to neo-feudal depoliticizing machinery that can only worsen inequality between the rural 
and urban areas as well as between the white people and the black people in the country. It should be borne in mind that 
the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act applies only to the rural African populations. This happens in spite of the fact that 
many people of other racial groups also live in rural areas and in that province in particular. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
It is a fundamental principle of democracy that all people in a country should be treated equally before the law. While this 
constitutional process is aimed at appeasing the tribal ideologues, it gives rise to many other problems. Subjecting the 
rural people to the rule of chieftaincy creates elements of discrimination because that law applies only to African people 
residing in rural areas particularly in KwaZulu-Natal.  
There is no basis to believe that the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act is aimed at helping the country address 
its developmental needs. On the contrary, by recognising unelected leadership, the Act entrenches neo-feudalism to 
serve the interests of the elite tribal ideologues. Because of its controversial political importance, the Act should at least 
have been subjected to a referendum. It should not have been limited to the views of the few elites who purport to be 
acting in the interests of the people in rural areas. It could therefore be regarded as perpetuating bantustanism politics of 
depoliticizing and re-tribalizing the rural areas, and promoting neo-feudalism. 
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